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[1769] 
Simplicity v. Reality in the Workplace: 
Balancing the Aims of 
Vance v. Ball State University and  
the Fair Employment Protection Act 
Elizabeth Lee* 
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, an employer can be held liable for 
harassment or discrimination by a supervisor. In 2013, in Vance v. Ball State University, 
the Supreme Court narrowed the definition of supervisor, limiting victims’ ability to prevail 
on vicarious liability claims. In response, Congress proposed the Fair Employment 
Protection Act (“FEPA”), which sought a return to the broader, pre-Vance definition of 
supervisor. While Congress has been successful in overriding decisions inconsistent with 
Title VII’s aims in other contexts, FEPA did not gain enough momentum and eventually 
failed. As a result, the Vance decision stands, posing an obstacle to many employees whose 
harassers were not supervisors, but still controlled nearly every aspect of their daily work. 
 
Arguing that neither the pre- nor the post-Vance definition of supervisor fully recognizes 
workplace realities, this Note proposes a tiered liability structure based on the actual 
workplace dynamic between harasser and victim. This broader structure reaches 
harassment by those with the apparent authority to take tangible employment actions. This 
additional category is important because, if an employee is not aware of a superior’s 
authority or has reason to believe that her harasser can fire or demote her, it does not matter 
whether the harasser actually has the authority to do so. However, if employers have 
exercised reasonable care in preventing or correcting harassment, this structure provides for 
an affirmative defense against vicarious liability. Further, the structure applies a negligence 
standard to harassment by coworkers or those who are clearly day-to-day supervisors.  
 
As the workplace continues to take on new forms, this structure would allow employers to 
minimize liability through clear employee structuring and proper training; victims to seek 
redress through the category that most aptly reflects their harassers’ authority over them; 
and courts to more accurately evaluate supervisory status and liability. In effect, this 
structure can improve efficiency and accuracy throughout the litigation process. 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, 2016, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; Executive Notes 
Editor, Hastings Law Journal; B.A., 2012, University of San Diego. My sincerest gratitude to Professor 
Michelle Travis of the University of San Francisco for her perspective and support throughout this 
experience and for helping me to articulate my vision for this Note. I would also like to thank Hastings 
Law Journal Notes editors, Mohneet Dhaliwal, Regina Durr, and Traci Aoki, and the entire 
Production Department for their outstanding work. It has been a great privilege to work alongside all 
of you. Lastly, thank you to my loving parents, Patrick and Nancy Lee, for their unwavering 
confidence in me. It is because of you, and the values you have instilled in me, that I have reached this 
point in my life and career. 
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In the midst of the countless complexities and nuances governing 
today’s legal system, meritorious claims may nevertheless succeed or fail 
on the interpretation of a single word. Holding substantial interpretive 
power, courts have the authority and the opportunity to dictate the 
future path of the statute at hand. Through the practice of statutory 
interpretation, courts can choose to either honor or set aside the 
underlying aims of the legislation in question. The way in which many 
courts have interpreted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title 
VII”)1 exemplifies this judicial discretion. 
Under Title VII, it is an “unlawful employment practice for an 
employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
 
 1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2013). 
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compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of 
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”2 However, 
Title VII’s strength is diminished when courts interpret it in a manner 
that limits protection for employees. By displacing the aims of Title VII, 
courts not only inhibit plaintiffs’ opportunities for redress, but also 
dismiss Congress’ efforts to address the ever-present problems of 
workplace discrimination and harassment. With the “realm of the 
workplace”3 constantly changing, courts and Congress must 
communicate to ensure that employers and the judicial system effectuate 
Title VII in the modern workplace. 
Where the outcome of a case can turn on the definition of a single 
word, courts should carefully consider the impact of, and reaction to, its 
impending decision, including a possible response from Congress. If 
Congress chooses to override a judicial interpretation, it should proceed 
carefully and thoughtfully, upholding the aims of Title VII without 
rejecting the courts’ justification for a narrow interpretation out-of-hand. 
Recently, one such conflict between the judicial and legislative 
branches arose over the definition of “supervisor,” significantly impacting 
employees’ ability to bring claims under Title VII. In Vance v. Ball State 
University, the success of Maetta Vance’s claim for harassment in the 
workplace hinged on the courts’ interpretation of the term supervisor in 
the context of vicarious liability under Title VII.4 In Vance, the Supreme 
Court held that vicarious liability would only extend to employers who had 
“empowered th[e harassing] employee to take tangible employment 
actions against the victim, that is, to effect a ‘significant change in 
employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment 
with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a 
significant change in benefits.’”5 
To arrive at this narrow interpretation, the Court rejected the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission’s (“EEOC”) broad definition of a 
supervisor as either “(1) an individual authorized ‘to undertake or 
recommend tangible employment decisions affecting the employee,’ 
including ‘hiring, firing, promoting, demoting, and reassigning the 
employee’; [sic] or (2) an individual authorized ‘to direct the employee’s 
daily work activities.’”6 With the latter EEOC definition now removed from 
the analysis, the Court adhered to the pro-employer side of a circuit split, 
creating a significant roadblock for employees who are harassed by a 
 
 2. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
 3. Martha Chamallas, Lecture, Vicarious Liability in Torts: The Sex Exception, 48 Val. U. L. 
Rev. 133, 162–63 (2013). 
 4. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2441 (2013). 
 5. Id. at 2443 (citation omitted). 
 6. Id. at 2455 (citation omitted). 
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superior without this narrow range of authority.7 As a result, the Court’s 
definition of supervisor redrew the line between vicarious and negligence-
based liability in determining employer liability for harassment in the 
workplace under Title VII. Soon thereafter, members of Congress drafted 
the Fair Employment Protection Act (“FEPA”) in direct response to the 
Vance decision.8 The legislation proposed a return to the EEOC’s 
broader definition of supervisor, but ultimately died in Congress, leaving 
a broad range of employees unable to seek redress under the theory of 
vicarious liability for harassment in the workplace.9 
This Note proposes a response to the Court’s holding in Vance that 
would address the practical and public policy concerns voiced by both 
pro-employee and pro-employer advocates. Part I provides an overview 
of the Vance decision and the proposed FEPA legislation. Part II 
describes the pattern of congressional overrides in Title VII’s history, 
which provides context for the discussion of the Vance decision and 
FEPA. Part III discusses why FEPA would not have been successful in 
accomplishing Congress’ goals due to likely resistance from courts and 
employers. Part IV highlights the successes and failures of both the 
Vance decision and FEPA, suggesting ways in which a middle ground 
approach could address the concerns of the Court and Congress 
regarding modern-day business, judicial concerns, and the harsh realities 
that victims of harassment face. Finally, Part V proposes a solution in the 
form of a tiered structure of liability based on the designation of the 
harasser in one of four categories. The underlying purpose of this 
proposal is to better facilitate courts’ and employers’ acceptance and 
implementation of a congressional override as it applies to employer 
liability under Title VII. 
I.  Background 
Under Title VII, the question of whether the harasser was or was 
not her victim’s supervisor directly impacts the victim’s ability to hold 
her employer vicariously liable for the harm suffered. The Vance Court 
limited the scope of the supervisory authority for these purposes, and the 
 
 7. Catherine L. Fisk, Special Issue on Circuit Splits, Supervisors in A World of Flat Hierarchies, 
64 Hastings L.J. 1403, 1406 (2013) (“The circuits have clearly split on who constitutes a supervisor 
under Title VII, with the Seventh and Eighth Circuits having taken a relatively extreme position that 
only those who have the actual power to hire, fire, demote, transfer, and discipline workers are 
supervisors, and other circuits having accepted the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s 
(‘EEOC’) position that a Title VII supervisor includes one who has the authority to direct another 
employee’s daily activities, workload, or tasks.”). 
 8. Fair Employment Protection Act of 2014, H.R. 4227, 113th Cong. § 2(b) (2d Sess. 2014). 
 9. See H.R. 4227 (113th Cong.): Fair Employment Protection Act of 2014, GovTrack, https:// 
www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr4227 (last visited Aug. 5, 2016); see also S. 2133 (113th Cong.): Fair 
Employment Protection Act of 2014, GovTrack, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s2133 (last visited 
Aug. 5, 2016). 
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proponents of FEPA were unsuccessful in achieving a return to a 
broader definition. Examining the decision and the legislation more 
closely will shed light on where the judicial and legislative branches 
differed in their views of Title VII. 
A. VANCE V. BALL STATE UNIVERSITY 
Maetta Vance (“Vance”), an African-American woman employed 
at Ball State University (“the University”) as a catering assistant, alleged 
that Saundra Davis (“Davis”), a University catering specialist, had 
harassed her by directing racial slurs and threats towards her and 
engaging in behavior that included “glaring at her, slamming pots and 
pans around her, and intimidating her.”10 After Vance complained to 
management, who instructed the two employees to “respect” one 
another, the harassment worsened as the taunting, racial slurs, and 
threats continued.11 Ultimately proceeding to litigation, Vance alleged 
that the University was vicariously liable for Davis’ “creation of a racially 
hostile work environment” because she was Vance’s supervisor.12 The 
parties agreed that Davis could not take “tangible employment actions,” 
like hiring or firing, against Vance.13 Unfortunately, this characterization 
of Davis’ authority ultimately led to the defeat of Vance’s claim when the 
U.S. Supreme Court determined that for a vicarious liability action to 
stand, the harasser must have the authority to take “tangible 
employment action.”14 Affirming the Seventh Circuit and district court, 
the Court held that the University was not liable for Davis’ actions 
because Davis was not Vance’s supervisor and Vance could not 
otherwise prove the University’s negligence.15 
This trajectory from serious and repeated workplace harassment by 
an alleged supervisor, to an unfavorable outcome for the victim is not 
unique to Vance. As discussed in further detail below, many employees 
have alleged meritorious claims of verbal, physical, and sexual harm, 
only to have the success of their vicarious liability cases turn on the 
court’s opinion of whether the harasser constituted a supervisor.16 For 
 
 10. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2439. See Vance v. Ball State Univ., No. 1:06-cv-1452-SEB-JMS, 2008 WL 
4247836 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 10, 2008); Brief for Petitioner at 6, Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434 
(2013) (No. 11-556). 
 11. Brief for the Petitioner at 7, 9, Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013) (No. 11-556). 
 12. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2440 (citation omitted). 
 13. Id. (“The [district] court explained that BSU could not be held vicariously liable for Davis’ 
alleged racial harassment because Davis could not “‘hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline’” 
Vance and, as a result, was not Vance’s supervisor under the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of that 
concept.” (citation omitted)). 
 14. See id. and text accompanying note 13.  
 15. Id. (“The [Seventh Circuit] concluded that Davis was not Vance’s supervisor and thus that Vance 
could not recover from BSU unless she could prove negligence. Finding that BSU was not negligent with 
respect to Davis’ conduct, the court affirmed.” (citation omitted)). 
 16. See infra Parts IV.C, D, V.B. 
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those who never pursue reporting or litigating workplace harassment for 
fear of retaliatory action or financial instability, the Vance standard 
makes the decision to pursue these avenues all the more risky. 
B. The Fair Employment Protection Act 
Reacting to the Court’s decision in Vance, members of Congress 
introduced FEPA, calling for a return to the EEOC’s broad two-part 
definition of supervisor, which extends vicarious liability to actions by 
supervisors who can pursue tangible employment actions and supervisors 
who can direct day-to-day activities.17 Under the EEOC’s broader 
definition of supervisor, vicarious liability arises from harassment by “(1) 
an individual with the authority to undertake or recommend tangible 
employment actions affecting the victim of the harassment; or (2) an 
individual with the authority to direct the victim’s daily work activities.”18 
Several concerns motivated this reaction from both chambers of 
Congress.19 Senator Tammy Baldwin noted, “workplace harassment 
remains an unacceptable reality that threatens the economic security of far 
too many people, particularly women.”20 Representative George Miller 
took issue with the Vance decision because it “made it harder for victims of 
unlawful and insidious harassment to hold their employers accountable.”21 
In further criticism, Representative Rosa DeLauro expressed that the 
decision “reinforced the Roberts Court’s reputation as the most anti-
worker Supreme Court[] in our nation’s history.”22 Further concern arises 
because employers can now strategically utilize this narrow approach to 
their benefit and their employees’ detriment. Nancy Zirkin, Executive 
Vice President of The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human 
Rights, affirmed this concern, explaining that “[b]y redefining 
‘supervisor’ to exclude the managers that interact with workers on a day-
to-day basis, the Supreme Court has given corporations and middle 
management a free pass to skirt liability for abusing employees and 
lowered penalties for when they’re found guilty.”23 Overall, the Court’s 
narrow definition undermined the protections afforded in earlier cases24 and 
“ignore[d] the reality that employees with the authority to control their 
 
 17. Fair Employment Protection Act of 2014, H.R. 4227, 113th Cong. § 2(b) (2d Sess. 2014). 
 18. Id. 
 19. See Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions, Harkin, Baldwin, 
Miller, DeLauro Introduce Bill to Fight Workplace Harassment: “Fair Employment Protection Act” 
Restores Workplace Protections (Mar. 13, 2014). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. See generally Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. 
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) (exemplifying how the narrow definition of “supervisor” undermines 
workplace protections). 
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subordinates’ daily work . . . are aided by that authority in perpetuating a 
discriminatory work environment.”25 
The proponents of FEPA advocated for a return to the EEOC 
definition due to concern with the Vance decision’s negative impact on 
victims’ ability to seek redress for workplace harassment suffered. 
Despite their intention to uphold the spirit of Title VII,26 Congress 
ultimately did not enact FEPA,27 which essentially reverted to the 
EEOC’s previous interpretation, and further failed to contemplate any of 
the rationales, as expressed in Vance, for narrowing the definition of 
supervisor. For example, the Vance majority had discussed certain 
aspects of the modern workplace (such as less hierarchical employee 
structures and increasingly shared responsibilities) and of the judicial 
system (such as the likelihood of jury confusion when complex jury 
instructions are used) as modern-day rationales for its decision. 
However, the FEPA drafters ignored these, and other valid 
considerations.28 In doing so, Congress chose an ineffective course of 
action. Specifically, when employers’ and courts’ legitimate concerns are 
left unaddressed, Congress runs the risk that its proposed policies29 might 
not be strong enough to withstand resistance from courts and employers 
that prefer the simplicity of Vance’s singular definition of supervisor. 
Within the realm of Title VII, the Court and Congress have engaged 
in a pendulum-like dialogue. Generally, this back-and-forth begins when 
the Court arrives at a narrow interpretation of the law and, in reaction, 
Congress quickly responds with sweeping legislation that fails to 
incorporate practical considerations. Next, holding steadfast to less 
progressive interpretations of Title VII, courts and employers refuse to 
accept the congressional response in full. As discussed in Part III of this 
Note, Congress’ efforts are often challenged because employers refuse to 
revise their practices to reflect pro-employee changes, and courts 
continue to apply precedent as they choose, even if doing so conflicts 
with the new legislation. Drafted less than one year after the Vance 
decision, FEPA is an example of Congress’ pattern of reverting to a 
previous interpretation under the law, and essentially ignoring the 
Supreme Court’s holding. 
This repeated interaction between the branches and other actors 
suggests that there may be an unrealized opportunity for Congress to 
 
 25. Fair Employment Protection Act of 2014, H.R. 4227, 113th Cong. § 2(a)(11), (14) (2d Sess. 
2014). This notion that supervisory authority aids employees who harass others partially lays the 
groundwork for the proposed second category discussed in Part V.B.  
 26. See U.S. Senator Tammy Baldwin, The Fair Employment Protection Act: When Our Workers 
Have the Opportunity to Success, Am. Succeeds, https://www.baldwin.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/ 
FairEmploymentProtectionActBckrnd.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 2016). 
 27. See all sources cited supra note 9. 
 28. See generally Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013) (discussing these realities).  
 29. See, e.g., H.R. 4227 (discussing the need to protect low-wage workers). 
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respond thoughtfully to the Court’s decisions in times of disagreement, 
so that it can establish real-world solutions that courts and employers will 
not subsequently resist. The fact that FEPA never became a reality 
suggests that there was a missed opportunity to modernize the 
understanding of vicarious liability under Title VII in a way that is 
agreeable to employees, employers, and their respective advocates, alike. 
II.  A Repeating Pattern Sought to Be Repeated Again 
Central to this dialogue is Title VII, which deems it an “unlawful 
employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin.”30 As interpreted, Title VII has been held, more 
specifically, to prohibit discrimination in employment decisions with direct 
economic consequences; the creation of a hostile work environment; and 
discriminatory acts carried out by employers’ agents.31 The Court took a 
step towards de-privatizing harassment and placing it “squarely within the 
realm of the workplace”32 when it recognized for the first time that a 
harasser’s creation of a hostile environment can affect the victim as well as 
other coworkers.33 The Vance decision, however, indicates that the Court 
is not always willing to de-privatize harassment to the fullest extent 
necessary to protect victims. Congress’ response in FEPA further 
suggests that the dialogue over the proper definition of supervisor has 
not yet ended. 
Regarding this dialogue between the judicial and legislative 
branches, Congress has repeatedly overridden the Court’s decisions, 
particularly in the context of Title VII. A congressional override has 
been defined as legislation that: 
(1) completely overrules the holding of a statutory interpretation decision, 
just as a subsequent Court would overrule an unsatisfactory precedent; (2) 
modifies the result of a decision in some material way, such that the same 
case would have been decided differently; or (3) modifies the 
consequences of the decision, such that the same case would have been 
decided in the same way but subsequent cases would be decided 
differently.34 
Two associated studies have examined these overrides, identifying 
six common factors among the underlying, and ultimately overridden, 
 
 30. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2013). 
 31. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2440–41; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b) (2013). 
 32. Chamallas, supra note 3, at 162–63. 
 33. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986). 
 34. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 Yale 
L.J. 331, 332 n.1 (1991). 
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Supreme Court decisions.35 Statistically, the factors most commonly 
correlated with overrides of the Court’s statutory interpretation include: 
(1) close division (plurality or 5- or 6-Justice majority) among the Justices 
when deciding the case; (2) judicial rejection of the interpretation offered 
by a federal agency and usually defended by the Solicitor General; (3) 
judicial narrowing of federal regulation, except in tax and intellectual 
property cases, where regulation-friendly interpretations are often 
overridden; (4) reliance on plain meaning of statutory texts, especially 
when such reliance depends critically on whole act and whole code 
arguments or flies in the face of strong legislative history; and (5) 
invitations for Congress to override, issued by majority, concurring, or 
even dissenting Justices.36 
Further analysis of the most highly publicized overrides has 
demonstrated that there is a subset of “restorative” overrides through 
which Congress seeks to “restore” its interpretation of statutory lawan 
interpretation that is often also shared by the implementing agency but 
rejected by the Court.37 This repeating pattern of restorative overrides is 
particularly prevalent at the crossroads of antidiscrimination law and 
employment law.38 For example, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 
197839 and the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 200940 are two prominent 
congressional efforts in response to Supreme Court decisions that were 
criticized for curtailing minorities’ and women’s rights under Title VII by 
way of narrow interpretation.41 Similarly, FEPA set out to override 
Vance and restore the EEOC’s pro-employee interpretation of 
supervisor. Drawing this parallel, Representative DeLauro noted that, in 
Vance, a slim five-four majority once again “struck at the heart of 
longstanding civil rights laws,” “[j]ust as [it] did with Lilly Ledbetter’s 
case.”42 
There are several key examples in Title VII’s history that best 
illustrate the dynamics of this override system. For example, the Court’s 
decision in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,43 which interpreted Title VII 
to allow pregnancy-based employment discrimination, prompted a 
restorative overridethe Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978.44 The 
General Electric Co. decision reflected the factors common in overridden 
decisions including: a six-Justice ideologically conservative majority;45 
 
 35. Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of Supreme 
Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967–2011, 92 Tex. L. Rev. 1317, 1420 (2014).  
 36. Id. at 1321. 
 37. Id. at 1319. 
 38. Id. at 1359. 
 39. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006)). 
 40. Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (codified in scattered sections of 29, 42 U.S.C.). 
 41. Christiansen & Eskridge, Jr., supra note 35, at 1381.  
 42. U.S. Senate Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions, supra note 19. 
 43. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). 
 44. Eskridge, Jr., supra note 34, at 352. 
 45. Id. at 353. 
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rejection of the EEOC’s interpretation of sex discrimination under Title 
VII;46 and reliance on the plain meaning of statutory text47 and 
constitutional precedent.48 In response, the Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act of 1978 aimed to restore women’s rights by declaring pregnancy-
based discrimination unlawful.49 
More recently, the Court rejected the EEOC’s statutory 
interpretation in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,50 prompting 
Congress to respond with the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009.51 The 
day the Court handed down the Ledbetter decision, “[r]ed flags” indicative 
of an override “were flying all around” including: a five to four division 
among the Justices; rejection of a position long-held by the EEOC; 
significant narrowing of a regulatory scheme; adherence to a “plain 
meaning and whole code approach that denigrated legislative history 
arguments;” and a “plea for an override from the four dissenting 
Justices.”52 In her Ledbetter dissent, Justice Ginsburg referred to the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, stating “[o]nce again, the ball is in Congress’ court . . . to 
correct this Court’s parsimonious reading of Title VII.”53 Doing just that, the 
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 sought to restore women’s right to 
equal pay. The Act “clarif[ied] that a discriminatory compensation decision 
or other practice that is unlawful under [Title VII and related Acts] occurs 
each time compensation is paid pursuant to the discriminatory 
compensation decision or other practice, and for other purposes,”54 
increasing victims’ opportunities to bring claims for discriminatory 
compensation. 
The five “flags” indicative of an impending override were present in 
Vance: a five-Justice majority;55 rejection of the EEOC’s “nebulous” 
 
 46. Gen. Elec. Co., 429 U.S. at 142–43 (“The EEOC guideline in question does not fare well under 
these standards. It is not a contemporaneous interpretation of Title VII, since it was first promulgated eight 
years after the enactment of that Title. More importantly, the 1972 guideline flatly contradicts the position 
which the agency had enunciated at an earlier date, closer to the enactment of the governing statute. . . . 
There are also persuasive indications that the more recent EEOC guideline sharply conflicts with other 
indicia of the proper interpretation of the sex-discrimination provisions of Title VII.”).  
 47. Eskridge, Jr., supra note 34, at 388 (“The Court rested its decision primarily upon a 
constitutional precedent which held that depriving women of pregnancy benefits was not gender-based 
discrimination prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause.” (citation omitted)). 
 48. Gen. Elec. Co., 429 U.S. at 145 (“The concept of ‘discrimination,’ of course, was well known at 
the time of the enactment of Title VII, having been associated with the Fourteenth Amendment for 
nearly a century, and carrying with it a long history of judicial construction. When Congress makes it 
unlawful for an employer to ‘discriminate [] because of [] sex [],’ without further explanation of its 
meaning, we should not readily infer that it meant something different from what the concept of 
discrimination has traditionally meant[.]” (citations omitted)). 
 49. Christiansen & Eskridge, Jr., supra note 35, at 1335.  
 50. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007). 
 51. Christiansen & Eskridge, Jr., supra note 35, at 1449.  
 52. Id. at 1443.  
 53. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 661 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 54. Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (codified in scattered sections of 29, 42 U.S.C.). 
 55. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2438 (2013). 
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definition of supervisor;56 narrowing of “supervisor” to exclude 
employees who control coworkers’ day-to-day activities;57 reliance on 
Title VII’s nonuse of “supervisor;”58 and an invitation from Justice 
Ginsburg to override“[t]he ball is once again in Congress’ court to 
correct the error into which this Court has fallen, and to restore the 
robust protections against workplace harassment the Court weakens 
today.”59 With the Vance opinion “furiously waving all five red flags,” 
members of Congress attempted to repeat the override pattern with 
FEPA in 2014.60 
III.  The Fair Employment Protection Act Would Not Have Been the 
Next Successful Congressional Override 
Congressional overrides are signs of congressional health because 
these efforts are significant opportunities to update public policy to 
reflect current norms.61 However, if congressional overrides are devised 
and implemented as knee-jerk reactions to the Court’s decisions, the goal 
of changing public policy cannot be as readily accomplished. Instead, 
Congress should seize these opportunities fully by considering current 
workplace realities, judicial efficiency, and the likelihood of 
implementation by the courts and employers. Recognizing the concerns 
on both sides, Congress can effectively move public policy forward, 
clarify the law, and mitigate the chance that courts and employers will 
undermine these overrides.62 
The Court’s decision in Ledbetter63 illustrates the unfortunate reality 
that many restorative overrides do not accomplish Congress’ intended 
goals for new legislation.64 The scenario, referred to as the “Lilly 
Ledbetter problem,” arises when the Court interprets an override as 
leaving it with the option to apply an overridden holding in situations not 
explicitly covered by the language of the new statute.65 For example, in 
Ledbetter, the Court decided that those claiming unequal pay under Title 
VII must file their claims within 180 or 300 days after the first paycheck 
 
 56. Id. at 2443. 
 57. Id. at 2455 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The Court today strikes from the supervisory category 
employees who control the day-to-day schedules and assignments of others, confining the category to 
those formally empowered to take tangible employment actions.”). 
 58. Id. at 2446 (“[P]etitioner is misguided in suggesting that we should approach the question 
presented here as if ‘supervisor’ were a statutory term. ‘Supervisor’ is not a term used by Congress in 
Title VII. Rather, the term was adopted by this Court in Ellerth and Faragher as a label for the class of 
employees whose misconduct may give rise to vicarious employer liability.”). 
 59. Id. at 2466 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 60. Christiansen & Eskridge, Jr., supra note 35, at 1413. 
 61. Id. at 1322, 1414. 
 62. Id. at 1443. 
 63. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 618. 
 64. Christiansen & Eskridge, Jr., supra note 35, at 1443. 
 65. Id.  
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showing the unequal paya difficult burden to bear given that many 
claimants would not have the necessary access to their male coworkers’ 
pay information to prove the discrepancy.66 In reaching this decision, the 
Court relied on two authorities, Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc.67 
and the Civil Rights Act of 1991.68 First, the Court looked to Lorance 
because it too had imposed a burdensome time limit of 180 or 300 days 
on female employees’ complaints about allegedly discriminatory 
seniority rules.69 Second, the Court looked to the Civil Rights Act of 
1991, which amended Title VII to provide a more employee-friendly 
time limit for seniority claims only.70 Using these two authorities, the 
Ledbetter Court opined that the permissive limitation under the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 did not apply to all sex or race discrimination claims 
(such as sex-based unequal pay), but only to seniority claims.71 
Along with the Ledbetter Court, other courts have similarly resisted 
restorative overrides and relied instead upon overridden decisions.72 
Lower courts continue to cite the overridden Lorance decision with 
regard to statutes of limitations.73 Furthermore, the Supreme Court 
continues to apply overridden decisions involving the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act74 (“ADEA”).75 For example, in Gross v. FBL 
Financial Services, Inc.,76 the Court interpreted the ADEA “less liberally” 
than Title VII, and relied on Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,77 a decision 
explicitly overridden by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.78 Again, in Smith v. 
City of Jackson,79 the Court deliberately applied the overridden Wards 
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio80 decision over the Civil Rights Act of 1991 on 
the grounds that “[w]hile the relevant 1991 amendments expanded the 
coverage of Title VII, they did not amend the ADEA or speak to the 
 
 66. Id. at 1442. 
 67. Lorance v. AT&T Tech., Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989). 
 68. Christiansen & Eskridge, Jr., supra note 35, at 1442. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 1443. 
 73. Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the Separation of Powers: Statutory Interpretation of 
Congressional Overrides, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 511, 546 (2009); see, e.g., Lettis v. U.S. Postal Serv., 39 F. 
Supp. 2d 181, 195 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (quoting Lorance, 490 U.S. at 907, without acknowledging the 1991 
amendments, for the proposition that in determining when a statute of limitations begins to run, “the 
proper focus is upon the time of the discriminatory acts, not upon the time at which the consequences of 
the acts became most painful”). 
 74. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621–24 (West 2000 & Supp. 2008)). 
 75. Widiss, supra note 73, at 544. 
 76. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009). 
 77. Lorance, 490 U.S. at 228. 
 78. Christiansen & Eskridge, Jr., supra note 35, at 1443 n.445. 
 79. Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss. 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005). 
 80. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
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subject of age discrimination. Hence, Wards Cove’s pre-1991 interpretation 
of Title VII’s identical language remains applicable to the ADEA.”81 The 
lesson to be learned through these examples is that Congress must 
recognize the ways in which courts respond to overrides and incorporate 
those realities into drafting new legislation.82 
In relation to Vance and FEPA, learning from courts’ conscious 
rejection of overrides is particularly important for two reasons. First, it is 
important because this problem arises most prominently in the context of 
workplace discrimination controversies that polarize the Court and 
Congress.83 Second, there is a concern that courts will continue to apply 
Vance despite the protections of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 where “[t]he 
boldness of the five-Justice majority in [Vance] . . . suggests that the sting 
of the 1991 CRA rebuke has worn off and that the majority does not fear a 
congressional response.”84 Both suggest that Congress might be more 
successful if it chooses to respond carefully, not hastily. 
A further issue is that the Court and Congress often diverge in their 
consideration of business realities. While business interests often succeed 
before the Court, the override process does not typically favor pro-
employer interests.85 Here, Congress’ reversion to the pro-employee, pre-
Vance definition of supervisor without much regard for the Court’s 
reasoning for a more narrow definition is an example of the branches’ 
split on the issue of business interests. With these competing interests, it 
would not be surprising if, following a new statutory override like FEPA, 
courts and employers would be resistant to these non-business-friendly, 
liability-expanding changes. 
IV.  The Need for a Non-Reactionary Override 
To address the concerns presented in both Vance and FEPA, it is 
important that any override of the Vance decision be thoughtful, non-
reactionary, and balanced. If Congress were to adopt such an approach 
when responding to the Court’s narrow decisions, the repeated 
pendulum-like swing from narrow Court decisions to broad, policy-
driven legislation, and back to judicial and employer resistance, could 
slow down, opening the door to sustainable progress. 
Evaluating the majority’s narrow interpretation of supervisor in 
Vance, the call for a response from Congress is justified because the 
decision is inconsistent with both the underlying intent and remedial 
 
 81. Widiss, supra note 73, at 547 n.162 (citation omitted). 
 82. Christiansen & Eskridge, Jr., supra note 35, at 1322–23. 
 83. See id. at 1443.  
 84. Id. at 1476.  
 85. Id. at 1380.  
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aims of Title VII.86 Narrowing the class of supervisors whose actions can 
result in vicarious liability for the employer, Vance left fewer avenues 
through which employers could be held vicariously liable for workplace 
harassment, reducing employers’ incentives to prevent discrimination 
and implement change in the workplace.87 
With these long-standing principles of Title VII in mind, FEPA 
must also be evaluated in light of whether it could have actually carried 
out those aims in practice. Factors discussed thus far in this Note that 
would have cast doubt on FEPA’s long-term effectiveness include: 
widespread liability being too unpredictable for courts; business interests 
being unaccounted for; and in pushing the pendulum as far as it can go, 
Congress often failing to address the practical concerns of enforcing new 
legislation. Even with these valid concerns, victims of workplace 
harassment must endure harsh realities that are more than troubling 
enough to shock the conscience into realizing that more needs to be done 
to protect lower-level employees from retaliation, and to ensure their 
access to redress. 
A. Business and Workplace Realities 
With the level of an employer’s liability resting so heavily on the job 
titles and descriptions of its employees, it is important that legislation 
accurately reflect the modern-day workplace and consider the interests 
of both employers and employees. Modern workplace trends that should 
be considered include: a less “hierarchical management structure” and 
“overlapping authority [among employees] with respect to the assignment 
of work tasks,” such that “[m]embers of a team may each have the 
responsibility for taking the lead with respect to a particular aspect of the 
work and thus may have the responsibility to direct each other in that area 
of responsibility.”88 Another reality is the lack of presence of “clearly 
supervisory employees . . . on the premises at all times . . . [such that] there 
will be no one around who is clearly a supervisor.”89 
The Vance majority responded to these realities in a manner that 
predominately benefitted employers. One such benefit under Vance is 
improved clarity as a result of a singular definition of supervisor. 
Employers are inclined to favor this narrower interpretation because it 
reduces the range of employees who may constitute supervisors, and 
thereby reduces the risk of vicarious liability.90 Modern organizations are 
further drawn towards a more narrow definition of supervisor where 
 
 86. Lakisha A. Davis, Who’s the Boss? A Distinction Without a Difference, 19 Barry L. Rev. 155, 
172 (2013). 
 87. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 246465 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 88. Id. at 2452. 
 89. Fisk, supra note 7, at 1404. 
 90. Id. at 1415. 
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employees have overlapping responsibilities and levels of authority are 
blurry.91 Where a traditional hierarchical management structure does not 
apply or exist, and many employees have the power to assign tasks to one 
another, limiting the designation of supervisor to those who can take or 
suggest “tangible employment actions” allows for some added clarity in 
determining vicarious liability.92 
This flattening of hierarchical employee structures, however, is not 
without consequences with regard to establishing a clear chain of 
command. Under these flatter structures, lower-level supervisors are taking 
on increasingly managerial roles and making decisions that affect 
employees’ everyday work including: the maintenance of safety, cleanliness, 
and equipment; employee training and scheduling; and facilitating “human 
relations” counseling, union-management relations, and other external 
relations.93 Though team-based structures typically engender notions of a 
collaborative and communicative work environment, these structures are 
arguably driving courts’ determinations that harassers are mere coworkers, 
not supervisors. Furthermore, if employees were better informed of their 
supervisors’ authority over them, victims of workplace harassment would 
likely feel more secure in their decisions to report harassment, knowing, 
for example, that their harasser is not actually authorized to take 
substantial retaliatory action against them. 
With the majority’s focus largely on employers’ interests, Vance fell 
short of upholding the aims of Title VII, especially in light of the 
decreasing presence of clear supervisory authority and the increasing 
presence of lower-level supervisors.94 For example, Justice Ginsburg 
found the modern-day, less hierarchical structure to be troubling for 
victims who perceive their harassers to have supervisory authority over 
them. She explained, “the definition of a supervisor that we now adopt is 
out of touch with the realities of the workplace, where individuals with 
the power to assign daily tasks are often regarded by other employees as 
supervisors.”95 Under this new standard, an employee who has endured 
harassment at the hands of someone whom he or she perceives to possess 
supervisory authority will be deprived of the greatest form of redress if 
the harasser did not possess “tangible employment action” authority. 
Instead, in order to prevail, a plaintiff harassed by an individual outside 
 
 91. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2452. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Fatima Goss Graves et al., Nat’l Women’s Law Ctr., Reality Check: Seventeen Million 
Reasons Low-Wage Workers Need Strong Protections from Harassment 5 (2014) (citations omitted). 
 94. Across the following fields: transportation; farming, forestry, and fishing; sales; personal care; 
cleaning and maintenance; and food preparation and services, for every 100 low-wage workers there 
are approximately eighteen lower-level supervisors and merely four managers. Id. at 9. 
 95. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2452. 
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the scope of this narrow definition is forced to prove the company’s 
negligence in preventing or stopping the harassment.96 
This new standard is troubling because these distinctions in 
authority do not lessen the detrimental impact of the harassment on the 
victim. Drawing the line for vicarious liability at a harasser’s ability to 
take tangible employment actions is problematic for victims because in 
the “all-too-plain” reality of the workplace, “[a] supervisor with 
authority to control subordinates’ daily work is no less aided in his 
harassment than is a supervisor with authority to fire, demote, or 
transfer.”97 An abuse of power capable of deterring resistance or 
reporting can arise from any level of vested power to control another’s 
workplace activities, and is not limited to the authority possessed by the 
Vance category of supervisor.98 This reality highlights the importance of 
the “apparent authority” supervisor discussed in Part V.B. 
FEPA notably called attention to these concerns with the Vance 
decision as they affect vulnerable employee populations: 
Individuals who direct the daily work activities of employees but do not 
have the authority to take tangible employment actions against those 
employees are common in the workplace in the United States, particularly 
in industries that employ low-wage workers. Workers in industries 
including retail, restaurant, health care, housekeeping, and personal care, 
which may pay low wages and employ a large  numbers of female workers, 
are particularly vulnerable to harassment by individuals who have the 
power to direct day-to-day work activities but lack the power to take 
tangible employment actions.99 
Though Vance clearly has had an impact across industries, FEPA 
failed to balance these concerns with those important to the Vance 
majority. For example, the drafters did not provide any guidance as to 
how employers could implement policies and train employees in light of 
this broader liability, but without being overcome by the risk of 
litigation. FEPA also failed to address modern-day, “flattened” 
employee structures, which often blur the lines between supervisor and 
subordinate. Where the two branches refuse to acknowledge one 
another’s concerns, the pendulum swings on. 
B. Judicial Realities 
When interpreting Title VII, challenging questions should be 
resolved in a manner that is workable and does not overburden those 
who must implement the law. Actors likely to be overburdened in this 
area of law include courts, juries, employers, employees, and human 
resource professionals. 
 
 96. Fisk, supra note 7, at 1415. 
 97. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2458 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Fair Employment Protection Act of 2014, H.R. 4227, 113th Cong. § 2(a)(15) (2d Sess. 2014). 
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Acknowledging these concerns, the Vance majority explained that 
its interpretation of supervisor is favorable because it can be “readily 
applied.”100 Justice Alito explained that prior to litigation, parties would 
be able to better determine the alleged harasser’s statussupervisor or 
coworkerduring discovery, assess the strength of the claim, and 
consider options for resolution.101 Further, the single definition of 
supervisor will improve efficiency in the pre-litigation stage because the 
determination of the alleged harasser’s status as a mere coworker, rather 
than a supervisor, will allow for earlier disposal of those cases.102 When 
the alleged harasser’s supervisory status is determined as a matter of law, 
parties will be able to focus their efforts on the applicable framework.103 
If the harasser is deemed a supervisor, then the defendant will have the 
burden of proving an affirmative defense.104 In comparison, if the 
harasser is deemed a coworker, then the plaintiff will have the difficult 
burden of proving employer negligence.105 
During litigation, this singular category of supervisors would allow for 
more straightforward factfinding, jury instructions, and analysis. For 
example, even if the question of supervisor versus coworker cannot be 
determined before trial because there is a genuine dispute about the 
harasser’s authority, the question can be more readily resolved based on 
further analysis of any authority to take “tangible employment actions.”106 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito agreed with this opinion, and 
during the oral argument in Vance, they praised the advantages of such a 
simple, narrow rule, including improved efficiency where courts would no 
longer have to sift through the facts in “countless cases” to determine 
supervisory status.107 With regard to juries, there is a persistent concern 
that “unnecessarily complicated instructions complicate a jury’s job in 
employment discrimination cases.”108 To resolve this complication, “more 
straightforward instructions [like Vance’s singular definition of supervisor] 
‘provid[e] the jury with clearer guidance of their mission.’”109 
Despite these practical advantages, Vance falls short of preserving 
the aims of Title VII. As Justice Ginsburg noted in her dissent, 
establishing such a simple approach can detract from other goals of Title 
VII and the judicial system.110 She explained that the Court, as it did in 
 
 100. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2438. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Davis, supra note 86, at 167. 
 103. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2450. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 2448. 
 107. Fisk, supra note 7, at 1418 (citation omitted). 
 108. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2451 n.13. 
 109. Id.  
 110. Id. at 2462. 
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Ledbetter, had once again sacrificed the protection against workplace 
discrimination sought by Congress in Title VII for the sake of “simplicity 
and administrability.”111 Challenging the majority’s resistance to fact-
finding, Justice Ginsburg noted that its focus on creating a simple rule for 
instant application was in conflict with the Court’s usual consideration of 
the specific facts in Title VII cases.112 Comparing the two primary 
questions in this line of cases(1) whether the harassment or retaliation 
occurred, and (2) whether the alleged harasser is a supervisor or a 
coworker. Justice Ginsburg explained that both are subject to the same 
level of factual inquiry into the “constellation of surrounding 
circumstances, expectations, and relationships.”113 
Justice Ginsburg also criticized the majority’s narrow gateway into 
vicarious liability for its burdensome impact on victims’ ability and 
willingness to sue.114 In the case of victims who have not been harassed by 
an individual with such explicit “tangible employment action” authority, 
their only means for redress will be proving employer negligence in 
failing to prevent or stop the harassment.115 With this “steeper 
substantive and procedural hill to climb,” Justice Ginsburg is concerned 
that victims will see filing a harassment claim as a “hazardous 
endeavor.”116 There is also the possibility that this narrow interpretation 
will reduce settlement amounts for victims because employers will not be 
as inclined to settle and employees will be more wary of pursuing trial for 
fear that their cases may be dismissed.117 While the drafters of FEPA 
shared Justice Ginsburg’s concerns, they did not give appropriate 
consideration to the efficiency arguments raised by the majority. 
Similar to its failure to address business realities, FEPA also failed 
to acknowledge the Court’s rationales for its narrow interpretation in 
favor of ready applicability. As an intended override of the Vance 
decision, FEPA could have addressed and incorporated either the 
majority’s or the dissent’s concerns. For example, it could have provided 
a means through which the majority’s need for efficiency could be 
 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 2463 (“The Court’s focus on finding a definition of supervisor capable of instant 
application is at odds with the Court’s ordinary emphasis on the importance of particular circumstances in 
Title VII cases. See, e.g., Burlington Northern [& Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White], 548 U.S. at 69, 126 S. Ct. 
2405 [2006] (‘[T]he significance of any given act of retaliation will often depend upon the particular 
circumstances.’); Harris [v. Forklift Sys., Inc.], 510 U.S. [17] at 23, 114 S. Ct. 367 [1993] (‘[W]hether an 
environment is ‘hostile’ or ‘abusive’ can be determined only by looking at all the circumstances.’)”); 
see also Davis, supra note 86, at 167 (citing Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 114 (2d Cir. 2007) (explaining 
that the question of “whether a particular work environment is objectively hostile is necessarily a fact-
intensive inquiry”)). 
 113. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2463 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 114. Id. at 2464 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Davis, supra note 86, at 167. 
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carried out by a definitional standard, or explained more explicitly that 
the dissent’s concerns regarding plaintiffs’ difficult procedural battle are 
substantial enough to outweigh the majority’s call for simplicity. Rather 
than address these concerns, the drafters reacted hastilycriticizing 
Vance118 and reverting to the EEOC’s previous definition of supervisor.119 
As a result, FEPA lacks a solid, well-rounded foundation as to why the 
two-prong definition of supervisor is integral to Title VII’s role in the 
modern workplace. 
Reviewing Vance and FEPA, each brought to light the successes and 
failures in attempts to answer the question“Who is a 
supervisor?”suggesting that neither offers the perfect solution. While 
the Vance majority did call attention to the legitimate interests of 
employers and courts, the Court seems to have forgotten the underlying 
aims of Title VII in the process. Conversely, Congress sought to uphold 
the aims of Title VII, but did so without regard for the challenges that 
come along with such expansive employer liability. In failing to 
incorporate the Court’s concerns, Congress did not facilitate courts’ and 
employers’ ability to better address instances of harassment by 
supervisors as they arise. 
Rather than engaging in a dialogue with the Court about creating a 
workable definition of supervisor, the drafters of FEPA changed the 
conversation to public policy and previous interpretations. If Congress 
could instead construct an approach for evaluating employer liability that 
better reflects current business and judicial realities, it could pave the 
way for a standard that neither leaves victims without adequate redress 
nor places an unrealistic burden on employers and courts. 
C. Employees’ Realities: “Between a Rock and a Hard Place” 
Though Congress’ reactionary effort to override the harm caused by 
the Vance decision failed, the harsh realities of harassment and abuse of 
authority are stark reminders that further action needed to fully protect 
employees under Title VII. Employees across industries, especially low-
wage workers, find themselves “between a rock and a hard place” when 
they experience harassment in the workplacechoosing between the risk 
of losing their job after reporting the harassment, and the risk of 
unsuccessfully litigating their claims under the narrow Vance standard.120 
Both risks are all the more threatening to low-wage workers, who are 
least able to bear the costs associated with the risk of losing their 
employment and jeopardizing their financial stability.121 
 
 118. Fair Employment Protection Act of 2014, H.R. 4227, 113th Cong. § 2(a)(11), (14) (2d Sess. 2014). 
 119. Id. § 2(b). 
 120. Goss Graves et al., supra note 93, at 2. 
 121. Id. at 4–5. 
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Even before any of these difficult decisions are made, victims must 
first make the impossible split-second decision to resist their harasser, or 
give way to their harassers’ force for fear of what might happen if they do 
not. One sector of employees facing these decisions far too regularly is 
agricultural-field workers. According to a recent study, eighty percent of 
150 female farm workers in the California Central Valley reported that 
they had experienced sexual harassment, varying from unwanted 
touching to rape.122 The uncertainty of what might happen next looms 
large for these workers, whose fears range from not being able to provide 
for their families to being deported. 
The story of Maricruz Ladino is just one example of the experience 
of many agricultural workers who must make the same impossible choice 
between job stability and their physical and psychological well-being.123 
Ladino worked in the agricultural fields for nearly eighteen years, and 
endured the troubling power dynamic of mistreatment and abuse that 
pervades the agricultural fields.124 She explained: 
One of the supervisors wanted me to go with him to check the crops. He 
insinuated that he wanted other things with me. One day we went to do an 
inspection in a field. He took the opportunity to abuse me. It happened in 
a place far from other people. I couldn’t say anything. I couldn’t even 
scream because it is very traumatic.125  
Despite the personal impact and pain of this experience, Ladino 
hesitated to report the incident for fear of being seen by management as 
a “troublemaker.”126 She explained her hesitation: “If I said anything I 
would lose my job. I couldn’t lose my job because I was the one taking 
care of my daughters.”127 Ladino is not alone in this battle between 
advocating for one’s own safety and ensuring one’s ability to provide 
shelter, food, and care for loved ones.128 No one should have to make this 
choice, but where harassers continue to use their perceived or actual 
authority to threaten their way out of being reported, and employers 
continue to escape liability through vague employee structures and 
inadequate preventative and remedial measures, victims continue to 
suffer. 
D. Realities in the Aftermath of VANCE 
Since the Court’s decision in Vance, its narrow definition of 
supervisor has already been applied to “insulat[e] employers from direct 
responsibility for conduct by supervisors who lack the actual authority to 
 
 122. Id. at 4 nn.4243. 
 123. Id. at 4 n.48 (citing Frontline: Rape in the Fields (PBS 2013)). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id.  
 128. Id. at 2. 
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hire and fire subordinates.”129 This limited avenue to vicarious liability 
poses a harsh reality for many employees, including Monica Fernando, a 
line cook in a fast food restaurant who was harassed and assaulted by her 
direct supervisor.130 Fernando’s supervisor could not take tangible 
employment actions, but he trained her, checked her work daily, and 
scheduled her shifts.131 “Eventually, he raped her.”132 Under the new 
standard, Fernando’s supervisor and many like him can be “recast” as 
mere coworkers despite their substantial control over their victims’ 
everyday employment.133 
In the aftermath of Vance, this recasting has started to take force. 
For example, Megan McCafferty, a fifteen-year-old McDonald’s 
employee, faced this tragic reality when the Tenth Circuit dismissed her 
claim because her harasser was not authorized to take tangible 
employment actions.134 After offering to drive McCafferty from school to 
work, Jacob Wayne Peterson, her shift supervisor, drove her to his 
friend’s house instead and informed her that she could have the day 
off.135 Peterson then allegedly sexually assaulted her for the next two days 
while “plying her with alcohol and drugs.”136 Applying the Vance 
standard, the Tenth Circuit determined that because Peterson did not 
have the authority to hire or fire employees, he did not qualify as a 
supervisor.137 The court made this determination despite the reality that 
Peterson was often the most senior employee on duty during 
McCafferty’s shifts, participated in the manager-in-training program, 
assigned duties, scheduled breaks, authorized overtime, and could send 
employees home for misconduct or when business was slow.138 In 
situations like the one faced by the young Megan McCafferty, Vance 
unfortunately “gives cover to employers who bury their heads in the sand 
when it comes to how their entry-level workers are treated.”139 
Following Vance, employers can alter their employee structures to 
their benefit by strategically “concentrat[ing] hire and fire power in the 
hands of a few higher-level managers while dispersing substantial daily 
 
 129. ERA Staff, What “Supervisor” (and the Fair Employment Protection Act) Means to Marginalized 
Women Workers, Equal Rts. Advocates (June 24, 2014), http://www.equalrights.org/what-supervisor-and-
the-fair-employment-protection-act-means-to-marginalized-women-workers/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2016). 
 130. Id. At the time when this post was written, Monica Fernando was an Equal Rights Advocates 
client. Her name was changed for purposes of this Article.  
 131. Id. 
 132. Id.  
 133. Id.  
 134. Goss Graves et al., supra note 93, at 14; McCafferty v. Preiss Enters., Inc., 534 F.App’x 726 
(10th Cir. 2013). 
 135. Goss Graves et al., supra note 93, at 14 (citation omitted). 
 136. Id. (citation omitted). 
 137. Id. (citation omitted). 
 138. Id. (citation omitted). 
 139. Id. at 11; See Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2443 (2013). 
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supervisory responsibilities among lower-level supervisors, whose 
harassment is far less likely to lead to employer liability.”140 In addition, 
attorneys are actively counseling corporate clients on ways to use Vance 
to their advantage. For example, one firm recommended that employers 
“consider strategic opportunities to capitalize on the Vance and 
McCafferty decisions by limiting the scope of authority that certain leaders 
possess in order to narrow the scope of [their] risk for vicarious 
supervisory liability,” and “note the limitations in the updated job 
descriptions . . . in establishing the leader is not a ‘supervisor’ for Title VII 
purposes.”141 This recommendation is a clear indication that attorneys and 
employers are not hesitating to incorporate Vance’s narrow standard into 
decisions affecting their employees. 
V.  Proposal: A Tiered Approach to Employer Liability 
With a less reactionary response to the Court’s narrow holding in 
Vance, Congress could construct legislation that successfully upholds the 
spirit of Title VII, but does not prompt resistance from courts and 
employers. This proposal, intended as a middle ground between Vance 
and FEPA, calls for a tiered approach to determining employers’ liability 
based on the designation of the harasser in one of four categories, 
including: (1) “tangible employment action” supervisor; (2) “apparent 
authority” supervisor; (3) “day-to-day” supervisor; and (4) coworker. 
These four categories would have corresponding levels of liability for the 
employer: vicarious liability with an available affirmative defense142 for 
categories one and two and negligence for categories three and four. 
Under this tiered structure, legislation could better accommodate 
workplace realities, employers’ legitimate business interests, employees’ 
need for genuine avenues of redress, and the judicial system’s concern 
for efficiency, as discussed earlier in this Note. 
This proposal represents a middle ground between Vance’s limited 
vicarious liability and FEPA’s broad approach, by balancing the interests 
of employers and employees (victims) in light of the case-specific 
employment structure and supervisory dynamic. Where the risk of 
vicarious liability is significant for employers under FEPA’s approach, 
 
 140. Goss Graves et al., supra note 93, at 14. 
 141. Id. at 14, 22 n.129 (citing Christopher S. Thrutchley, The Employer’s Legal Resource: 10th 
Circuit Ruling Good Win for Employers, but . . ., Doerner, Saunders, Daniel & Anderson LLP 
Lawyers (Sept. 3, 2013), http://www.dsda.com/News-Publications/Newsletters/25514/The-Employers-
Legal-Resource-10th-Circuit-Ruling-a-Good-Win-for-Employers-but). 
 142. The affirmative defense available under this proposal is consistent with that which was 
applied by the Court in Vance. It establishes that an affirmative defense exists where the employer can 
prove “(1) that it exercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct any harassing behavior 
and (2) that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective 
opportunities that were provided.” Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2442 (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 
524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998)). 
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this proposal provides employers with the opportunity to escape liability 
by proving an affirmative defense in categories one and two. Categories 
three and four uphold the Vance majority’s view that employers should 
not be held vicariously liable for the acts of “day-to-day” supervisors or 
mere coworkers.143 This approach also serves the interests of victims, 
particularly through category two, which recognizes situations in which 
the victim’s reasonable perception of the supervisor’s authority was 
strong enough to dissuade the victim from reporting harassment or 
discrimination for fear of retaliation. 
Where “[s]upervisors, like the workplaces they manage, come in all 
shapes and sizes,” this structure would be more cognizant of modern 
organizational structures.144 As the de-privatized “realm of the workplace” 
continues to evolve and take on different forms, a narrow definition of 
supervisor ignores the many scenarios in which harassment occurs.145 
Instead, a flexible approach will assist employees, employers, and courts in 
accurately evaluating Title VII claims and determining liability. In 
everyday business operations, human resource professionals could look to 
this framework when updating employee policies, investigating claims, 
conducting employee opinion surveys, or reevaluating current employee 
structures. With categories that acknowledge the vast differences across 
workplace environments, this proposal would better ensure that 
instances of harassment or discrimination are evaluated by means that 
are neither overly burdensome nor out of touch with the spirit of Title 
VII. 
Furthermore, this organized structure would address the Vance 
majority’s call for ready applicability by courts and employers alike. 
Prior to and during litigation, employers and employees (victims) could 
look to this framework when conducting discovery or strategizing with 
their respective counsel. During litigation, courts could compare the facts 
of a particular case to the features of each category, placing the harasser 
in the category that best fits the circumstances. With regard to analyzing 
a harasser’s status and conduct, a tiered structure incorporating different 
levels of supervisory authority and employer liability will reduce the 
tension between judicial efficiency and comprehensive fact-finding. 
Where “[c]ontext is often key,” courts need to examine the actual 
workplace relationship between the harasser and the victim.146 Under this 
tiered approach, courts can evaluate which category the supervisor best 
 
 143. Id. at 2455 (“The Court today strikes from the supervisory category employees who control 
the day-to-day schedules and assignments of others, confining the category to those formally 
empowered to take tangible employment actions.”); id. at 2439 (“If the harassing employee is the 
victim’s co-worker, the employer is liable only if it was negligent in controlling working conditions.”). 
 144. Id. at 2463. 
 145. Chamallas, supra note 3, at 16263.  
 146. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2462. 
Lee-67.6.docx (Do Not Delete) 9/8/2016 4:27 PM 
1792 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:1769 
fits into and proceed based on that designation to evaluate employer 
liability. 
A. Category One: “Tangible Employment Action” 
SupervisorVicarious Liability with an Affirmative Defense 
In this first category and consistent with Vance, an “employee is a 
‘supervisor’ for purposes of vicarious liability under Title VII if he or she is 
empowered by the employer to take tangible employment actions against 
the victim.”147 For this proposal, a tangible employment action retains the 
definition applied in Vance: “[A] significant change in employment status, 
such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly 
different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in 
benefits.”148 As a “defining characteristic” of supervisory authority, the 
power to take tangible employment actions is solid ground for vicarious 
liability because it is the means through which supervisors “bring[] the 
official power of the enterprise to bear on subordinates.”149 Further, this 
category aptly calls for vicarious liability because it applies to a distinct 
class of agents possessing the explicit authority to take employment 
actions against subordinate employees, rather than an “ill-defined class 
of employees who qualify as supervisors.”150 
When a harasser is deemed to fall within this first category, the 
employer will be vicariously liable if the harassing supervisor (1) 
ultimately takes a tangible employment action against the victim, or (2) 
creates a hostile work environment for which the employer cannot 
establish an affirmative defense.151 Employer liability for a harasser’s 
tangible employment action against the victim is justified because such 
an action is likely to require a company act and to have been 
documented by higher management.152 Even if the supervisor has not yet 
taken a tangible employment action, the employer should be liable for 
the creation of a hostile work environment because a supervisor’s vested 
power to take such an action injects a certain “threatening character” 
into her conduct.153 However, it is sometimes unfair or unreasonable to rest 
ultimate liability with the employer. If the employer can successfully show 
an affirmative defense “(1) that it exercised reasonable care to prevent and 
promptly correct any harassing behavior and (2) that the plaintiff 
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective 
opportunities that were provided,” then the employer may avoid vicarious 
 
 147. Id. at 2439. 
 148. Id. at 2456 (citations omitted). 
 149. Id. at 2448 (citations omitted). 
 150. Id.  
 151. Id. at 2441–42. 
 152. Id. at 2442. 
 153. Id. 
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liability.154 Otherwise, harassment by a “tangible employment action” 
supervisor will result in vicarious liability for the employer. 
B. Category Two: “Apparent Authority” SupervisorVicarious 
Liability with an Affirmative Defense 
In this second category of the tiered structure, a supervisor is 
defined as an employee with the apparent authority to take tangible 
employment actions against his or her victim. For the purposes of this 
category, apparent authority is defined as “the power held by an agent or 
other actor to affect a principal’s legal relations with third parties when a 
third party reasonably believes the actor has authority to act on behalf of the 
principal and that belief is traceable to the principal’s manifestations.”155 As 
applied in the context of workplace harassment, this standard of apparent 
authority means: “the power held by [the harasser] to affect [an employer’s] 
legal relations with [the victim] when [the victim] reasonably believes [the 
harasser] has authority to act on behalf of [the employer] and that belief is 
traceable to [the employer’s] manifestations.”156 In effect, this category 
would account for claims by victims whom we could imagine saying, “If I 
think my harasser can fire me, that will affect me in the same way as if my 
harasser can actually fire me” or, “If my employer is going to allow me to 
think that my harasser can fire me, then it should be liable.”157 Under this 
standard, employers would be vicariously liable for the harassment 
committed by employees who have apparent authority to take tangible 
employment actions. However, they would retain the same opportunity 
to prove the affirmative defense as employers possess under category 
one.158 
Both the EEOC and the courts have contemplated vicarious liability 
for harassment by employees with apparent authority.159 The EEOC 
discussed such liability in circumstances where “the chains of command 
are unclear” or “the employee might reasonably believe that a harasser 
with broad delegated powers has the ability to significantly influence 
employment decisions affecting him or her even if the harasser is outside 
the employee’s chain of command.”160 Courts have also recognized that 
 
 154. Id. (citation omitted); see supra note 142 (discussing the affirmative defense as provided in Vance). 
 155. Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.03 (2006). 
 156. Id. 
 157. With respect to what “[the] employer is going to allow [the] victim to think,” “manifestations” 
under the Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.03 should also include omissions because there is also a 
likelihood that an employer’s failure to inform the victim of other employees’ designated roles and 
responsibilities could cause the victim to endure the harassment for fear of retaliation by the harasser.  
 158. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2442 (2013). 
 159. See U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious Employer 
Liability for Unlawful Harassment by Supervisors, EEOC Order 205.001, Appendix B, 
Attachment 4 § a(5) (June 18, 1999), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/harassment.html [hereinafter 
EEOC Enforcement Guidance]. 
 160. Id. 
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in certain circumstances, apparent authority is an acceptable avenue for 
applying vicarious liability.161 These acknowledgements suggest that 
apparent authority is a cognizable and powerful force in certain 
employment structures and should be addressed accordingly. 
Within this category, the victim’s claim will rely heavily on a case-
specific factual inquiry, which is of crucial importance in workplace 
discrimination cases.162 To obtain a comprehensive understanding of the 
employment dynamic leading to the harassment, this inquiry would call 
for extensive, yet targeted, discovery. Examination of the following 
would shed light on employment operations and standards: Testimony 
(from the victim, the harasser, similarly-situated coworkers, members of 
higher management, etc.); formal job titles and descriptions; employment 
policies and handbooks; employee training materials on harassment in 
the workplace; and documentation from any complaints or reports 
regarding the alleged harassment. This list of relevant evidentiary 
materials would assist employers, attorneys, and courts in incorporating 
this category of liability into a workable standard. 
Access to such an extensive list of sources is important to this 
inquiry because, as asserted by Justice Ginsburg, a determination of 
supervisor status requires an examination of the specific facts of the 
workplace relationship, not merely the titles or job descriptions of the 
employees.163 For employers, awareness of this standard would encourage 
transparency in the workplace, prompting employers to draw clear lines 
between levels of employees in order to avoid liability for the actions of 
apparent authority supervisors (where it was reasonable for the victim to 
believe that the harasser could take tangible employment action against 
him or her). Even though this inquiry is time-intensive and fact-specific, 
courts partial to business interests may nevertheless accept this category, 
recognizing these evidentiary sources as opportunities for employers to 
mitigate the risk of vicarious liability. During trial, this list would provide 
specific items for attorneys, judges, and jurors to consider when 
determining whether the harasser had a sufficient level of apparent 
authority to take “tangible employment actions.” As a result, courts will 
be able to evaluate the evidence and arguments for and against a finding 
of apparent authority with increased clarity, and subsequently dismiss 
claims that do not satisfy this standard. Given these considerations, this 
 
 161. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 759 (“If, in the unusual case, it is alleged there 
is a false impression that the actor was a supervisor, when he in fact was not, the victim’s mistaken 
conclusion must be a reasonable one.”); see also Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 
1247 n.20 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Although the employer may argue that the employee had no actual 
authority to take the employment action against the plaintiff, apparent authority serves just as well to 
impute liability to the employer for the employee’s action.”). 
 162. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2463 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 163. Id. at 2454. 
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more extensive factual and evidentiary inquiry would benefit employers, 
victims, and courts in their mutual interest to achieve efficiency. 
The “apparent authority” supervisor is a justifiable addition to the 
employer liability scheme under Vance. Though this category is not as 
limited as the Court’s narrow definition in Vance, it still comports with 
the Court’s emphasis on needing something more than the ability to 
direct another’s tasks for a finding of vicarious liability.164 In this context, 
an alleged supervisor’s apparent authority provides the something more 
that the majority sought. To illustrate, if the employer has not clearly 
drawn the lines of an employee’s authority, then the harasser in a 
perceived supervisory capacity is no less empowered by that apparent 
authority when harassing others. As demonstrated by this illustration and 
the justifications provided below, the apparent authority supervisor 
would be an important addition to the Title VII framework because it 
calls attention to certain undeniable realities of the modern workplace. 
A further point in favor of vicarious liability is that the threat of 
such liability incentivizes employers to conduct preventative trainings 
about workplace harassment.165 Under Vance, the goals of vicarious 
liability, including redress for employees, would only be carried out to 
the extent that they apply to “tangible employment action” 
supervisorsexcluding those who do not have such authority but do 
control the work activities and schedules of other employees, like 
Monica Fernando discussed above in Part IV.D.166 In comparison, under 
this category of extended vicarious liability, employers would be 
incentivized to prevent and guard against misconduct by screening, 
training, and monitoring a broader range of employees.167 Where 
vicarious liability is recognized as a “cost of doing business,” employers 
should take responsibility, especially where that cost arises from an 
employer’s own failure to both inform potential victims of their rights 
and obligations in the face of harassment, and develop a structure in 
which employees cannot abuse their actual or apparent authority.168 
Given that the Court’s narrow definition of supervisor in Vance has 
substantially minimized the possibility of vicarious liability, this apparent 
authority category would be of significant benefit to future victims of 
workplace harassment.169 Under Vance, if a victim cannot prove that her 
harasser possessed “tangible employment action” authority, she is left with 
 
 164. Id. at 2448. 
 165. Davis, supra note 86, at 168. 
 166. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2464–65. 
 167. Id. at 2464 (citation omitted). 
 168. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 798 (1998) (“An employer can, in a general sense, 
reasonably anticipate the possibility of such conduct occurring in its workplace, and one might justify the 
assignment of the burden of the untoward behavior to the employer as one of the costs of doing business, 
to be charged to the enterprise rather than the victim.”). 
 169. Davis, supra note 86, at 167. 
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only a negligence claim, which requires her to prove “that the employer 
knew or should have known” about the harasser’s misconduct.170 The task 
of proving employer negligence is difficult for victims because specific 
evidence of negligence can be difficult to discover and “[an] employer’s 
failure to adopt a precaution might lurk in the background.”171 Where 
“[a]nyone engaged in the practice of law knows that negligence causes of 
action are generally more difficult to prove than strict and vicarious 
liability cases,” extending vicarious liability to harassers with apparent 
authority will help preserve victims’ opportunities for redress.172 
The workplace environment itself provides further justification for 
the inclusion of an “apparent authority” supervisor within the scheme of 
vicarious liability. It has been said that “‘the man in the street’ thinks of a 
corporation with its officers and employees as an identifiable unity, as in 
‘[t]hey ought to pay.’”173 In this context, employers “ought to pay” when 
a victim reasonably believes there is an “identifiable unity” between the 
employer and the harasser. Power dynamics and deference to authority 
further support the notion of apparent authority, especially where 
employers have not educated employees on proper workplace 
interactions and hierarchies. Professor Martha Chamallas discussed such 
deference in terms of “children and other vulnerable populations . . . 
expected to defer to authority figures [such as] police, guards, teachers, 
coaches, or doctors.”174 This concept can be applied to the workplace, 
where vulnerable groups, including women, minorities, and subordinate 
employees experience “a special risk that . . . deference will facilitate 
abuse.”175 Where a supervisor is able to take tangible employment actions 
against her victim, the victim will likely defer to such authority and 
refrain from reporting for fear of retaliation. Extending this analogy 
further, a harasser with apparent authority to take such actions will 
receive the same level of deference and complacency from her victim as 
one with the explicit authority to do so. 
Relatedly, a harasser’s ability to threaten “to alter a subordinate’s 
terms or conditions of employment” further justifies the application of 
vicarious liability in the apparent authority context.176 From the victim’s 
reasonable perspective, whether the harasser actually or apparently has 
such authority over subordinates arguably “hangs as a threat over the 
victim” in the same way.177 The comparison of harassment by coworkers 
as opposed to supervisors, as discussed by Justice Ginsburg, can also 
 
 170. Id. 
 171. Chamallas, supra note 3, at 153 (citation omitted). 
 172. Davis, supra note 86, at 167. 
 173. Chamallas, supra note 3, at 134–35 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
 174. Id. at 171–72. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2448 (2013). 
 177. Id. 
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apply to harassment by those with apparent supervisory authority.178 If 
harassed by a coworker, a victim can more easily walk away or tell the 
harasser to “buzz off.”179 In comparison, when the harasser has any 
authority, actual or apparent, to take some action against the victim, the 
victim will likely be reluctant to report, halted by the (actual or 
perceived) risk of an undesirable, unsafe, or disruptive assignment, 
transfer, workload, shift, demotion, or firing.180 
In addition, enterprise risk and institutional liability also support the 
application of vicarious liability to this category because “in the modern 
world, injuries [including harassment] are the ‘inevitable by-products of 
planned activities’” in the enterprise of the workplace.181 As Professor 
Chamallas discussed, “[a]n enterprise ‘fully causes’ the wrong of an 
employee if the dissolution of the enterprise and subsequent 
unemployment of the employee would reduce the probability of the wrong 
to zero.”182 Then, “even if an employee’s tort is personally motivated, it is 
efficient to impose vicarious liability on the employer if the tort was 
caused at least in part by the employment relationship.”183 Similarly, 
institutional liability recognizes the employer’s causal role in the creation 
or facilitation of the harm.184 As it would relate to apparent authority, this 
causation arises where the employer has not sufficiently informed its 
employees (potential victims) that they need not fear retaliation or worry 
that a tangible employment action may result in the aftermath of 
harassment. Where an employer has allowed supervisor-like employees 
to proceed with apparent authority that they can abuse in harassing 
others, the “systemic nature of the problem” becomes evident.185 These 
notions of enterprise risk and institutional liability arguably apply to the 
harassment cases discussed throughout this Note. 
The purpose of this category is to reach a middle ground between 
Vance and FEPA’s definitions of supervisor, extending vicarious liability 
further than Vance, but not too far. The Court has deemed vicarious 
liability to be justified where the employer is responsible for granting the 
tangible employment action that a harasser ultimately misuses against 
her victim.186 Conversely, the Court has recognized that a fellow 
employee’s mere “ability to direct” another’s day-to-day activities does 
not give rise to the same level of liability for employers.187 As applied, the 
 
 178. Id. at 2456. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Chamallas, supra note 3, at 156–57. 
 182. Id. at 152. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 172. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Davis, supra note 86, at 166. 
 187. Id. 
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use of apparent authority makes the line drawing between “tangible 
employment action” and “control of day-to-day activities” more 
favorable for victims and more acceptable to those seeking to uphold the 
spirit of Title VII. This is because the category would capture workplace 
scenarios where an employer has not officially granted this authority, but 
also has not satisfactorily informed employees of the true hierarchy of 
authority. When employers fail to inform of such a hierarchy, they have 
created a scenario in which one employee can abuse the victim’s 
perception of his or her authority, and the victim, reasonably believing in 
that authority, does not report the harassment for fear of an employment 
action against himself or herself. 
This category would likely extend vicarious liability to cases that fell 
outside the Vance definition but were highlighted by the dissent. In these 
cases, “[e]ach man’s discriminatory harassment derived force from, and 
was facilitated by, the control reins he held.”188 As Justice Ginsburg 
appropriately noted, “[u]nder any fair reading of Title VII, in each of the 
illustrative cases, the superior employee should have been classified a 
supervisor whose conduct would trigger vicarious liability.”189 Two of 
these cases involved facts that arguably fit within the features of this 
category. First is the story of Clara Whitten,190 whose manager told her 
on her first day of work that if she wanted approval for time off she had 
to “give [him] what [he] wanted.”191 After Whitten refused to meet the 
manager in an isolated storeroom, he reacted by doing the following: 
denying her the requested time off; instructing her to stay late and clean 
the store; and threatening to make her life a “living hell.”192 Though the 
manager did not have the authority to take tangible employment actions, 
he was able to control her day-to-day work activities.193 Where the 
manager was often the highest-ranking employee in the store and both 
Whitten and the manager thought of him as her supervisor, it is clear that 
the manager used this apparent authority strategically.194 Considering 
that the manager made the initial demand to “give [him] what [he] 
wanted” on Whitten’s first day of work, it is evident that he took 
advantage of some level of perceived authority from the start. 
Second is the story of Monika Starke,195 a newly hired truck driver, 
who was to be paired with “lead drivers” for the duration of a twenty-
 
 188. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2460 (2013). 
 189. Id.  
 190. Whitten v. Fred’s, Inc., 601 F.3d 231 (4th Cir. 2010), abrogated by Vance v. Ball State Univ., 
133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013). 
 191. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2459. 
 192. Id. at 2459–60. 
 193. Id. at 2460. 
 194. Id. 
 195. EEOC v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 679 F.3d 657 (8th Cir. 2012). 
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eight-day on-the-road training trip.196 These lead drivers did not have the 
authority to take tangible employment actions but did control activities 
during the trip (such as assigning tasks and scheduling rest stops) and, 
more importantly, were charged with “evaluat[ing] trainees’ performance 
with a nonbinding pass or fail recommendation that could lead to full 
driver status.”197 Two lead drivers harassed Starke during the duration of 
her training.198 The first “filled the cabin with vulgar sexual remarks.”199 
The second “forced her into unwanted sex with him, an outrage to which 
she submitted, believing it necessary to gain a passing grade.”200 Based on 
Starke’s belief that giving way to the driver’s force was necessary to pass 
her training, the employer arguably afforded these drivers with at least 
some level of apparent authority given their role in deciding whether or 
not trainees passed. Focusing less on the reasonableness of Starke’s 
belief and more on the training drivers’ actions, this situation, like Clara 
Whitten’s, arose when the victim was new to the employer and unaware 
of other employees’ level of authority over her. If courts were to accept 
this apparent authority category, employers would follow suittraining 
and educating their employees more effectively in order to mitigate the 
risk of vicarious liability. 
This category of apparent authority brings with it further benefits 
for both employees and employers. For employees, vicarious liability 
“saves the cost of investigating the existence of the untaken precaution 
and then litigating the negligence issue.”201 It would also “do a better job 
than a negligence regime in achieving . . . [the] goal of encouraging the 
employer’s cost-justified risk-reducing measures.”202 If such risk-reduced 
measures are then implemented, there will ideally be fewer instances of 
harassment in the workplace. Professor Chamallas echoed this point, 
explaining that vicarious liability encourages employers to be creative in 
their search for ways to make the workplace safer.203 For employers, this 
category suggests manageable steps to avoid vicarious liability. In 
developing a clear employee structure and training employees on the 
dynamics of that structure (such as who does and does not have “tangible 
employment action” authority over them), employers can mitigate the 
risk that a victim will successfully prove an apparent authority claim. In 
turn, this category then provides an additional benefit to better-informed 
 
 196. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2460; see Goss Graves et al., supra note 93, at 13–14, for a discussion of 
several similarly disturbing stories about female CRST Van Expedited, Inc. employees, who, like 
Monica Starke, were harassed and assaulted by lead drivers during their training trips. 
 197. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2460. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Chamallas, supra note 3, at 153. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 152. 
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employees by empowering them to report instances of harassment 
without fear of “tangible employment action” retaliation. 
In conjunction with such efforts to better structure and train 
employees, employers could further protect themselves from liability 
through increased use of indemnification. In application, indemnification 
would allow employers to avoid liability for the full extent of the harm 
caused by the harasser.204 If employers were to exercise indemnity rights 
more regularly, vicarious liability could deter employees, informed of the 
indemnification policy, from engaging in harassment.205 Exercising these 
rights would benefit employers where “it would seem that employers 
would want to distance themselves from the offending employee as much 
as possible.”206 Even though vicarious liability poses a greater risk to 
employers, it also provides them with an incentive to avoid liability. 
Conversely, the narrow definition provided by Vance will not only 
undercut initiatives to prevent harassment in the workplace, but will also 
lead to “imprudence by employers [that] will ultimately make them more 
vulnerable to harassment claims.”207 
C. Category Three: “Day to Day” SupervisorNegligence 
Arising from Breach of a Duty to Act 
Given the range of employee interactions that may lead to harassment 
in the workplace, the Court in Vance asserted that “[n]egligence provides 
the better framework for evaluating an employer’s liability when a harassing 
employee lacks the power to take tangible employment actions.”208 Through 
its narrow definition of supervisor, the Court broadened the scope of claims 
that will be reviewed under a negligence standard. For those viewing this 
more frequent escape from vicarious liability as problematic, the application 
of a truer negligence standard and a “duty to act” standard, which focuses 
on more tangible instances of employer negligence, would address concerns 
associated with lesser liability under negligence. 
While there is no general duty to act in tort law,209 such a duty may 
arise in light of certain exceptions.210 Analogizing to tort law, there are 
 
 204. Id. at 154. 
 205. Id. at 153–54. 
 206. Id. at 154. 
 207. Davis, supra note 86, at 168. 
 208. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2448 (2013). 
 209. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314 (1965) (“The fact that the actor realizes or should 
realize that action on his part is necessary for another’s aid or protection does not of itself impose 
upon him a duty to take such action.”); see id. § 315 (“There is no duty so to control the conduct of a 
third person as to prevent him from causing physical harm to another unless (a) a special relation 
exists between the actor and the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third 
person’s conduct, or (b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives to the 
other a right to protection.”). 
 210. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314 cmt. a (1965) (“The actor may have control of a third 
person, or of land or chattels, and be under a duty to exercise such control, as stated in §§ 316–20.”); 
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certain circumstances in which employers should have a duty to take 
specific reasonable actions, such as the scenario in which day-to-day 
supervisors can significantly harm employees by way of harassment and 
retaliatory action. One such exception, section 317 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, provides: 
A master211 is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control his 
servant while acting outside the scope of his employment212 as to 
prevent him from intentionally harming others or from so conducting 
himself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if . . . 
the servant . . is upon the premises in possession of the master or upon 
which the servant is privileged to enter only as his servant, or . . . is 
using a chattel of the master, and . . . the master . . . knows or has 
reason to know that he has the ability to control his servant, and . . . 
knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising 
such control.213 
This duty, hereinafter referred to as the “section 317 duty,” arises 
where an employee is acting outside the scope of her employment and 
either intentionally causes harm to others or creates an unreasonable risk 
of bodily harm, and can be readily applied to this context. Given the high 
unlikelihood that the scope of one’s employment would include 
discrimination or harassment, mistreating another employee in this way 
would fall outside the scope of one’s employment. Where harassment 
often involves the use of derogatory language, retaliatory actions, or 
other detrimental acts, the harasser’s harm is likely to have been 
intentional. Extending the risk of bodily harm to include psychological or 
emotional harm, this breach of duty would cover workplace scenarios 
where the harasser is creating a hostile environment in which other 
employees (victims or others) are afraid to speak up for fear of their 
well-being, or report to higher management. 
In most employment structures, the very nature of an employment 
relationship would satisfy section 317(a)(i)–(ii) because the employee is 
either on the premises owned by, or using the instrumentalities of, her 
employer. The employer’s awareness of the ability to control the 
harassing employee, required by section 317(b)(i), arises from the 
employer’s ability to take certain actions (such as tangible employment 
actions) against an employee for improper conduct. A more challenging 
 
id. § 314 cmt. c. (1965) (“The relations between the actor and a third person which require the actor to 
control the third person’s conduct are stated in §§ 316–19.”). 
 211. “Master” meaning “employer;” “Servant” meaning “employee.” See Restatement (Third) of 
Agency § 2.04 cmt. a (2006) (“This Restatement does not use the terminology of ‘master’ and 
‘servant.’”). 
 212. Id. § 7.07(2) (“An employee acts within the scope of employment when performing work 
assigned by the employer or engaging in a course of conduct subject to the employer’s control. An 
employee’s act is not within the scope of employment when it occurs within an independent course of 
conduct not intended by the employee to serve any purpose of the employer.”). 
 213. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 317 (1965).  
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factor for victims to prove might be the employer’s knowledge of the 
necessity and opportunity for control under section 317(b)(ii) given that 
the employer may be entirely unaware of the harassment. However, 
there is nonetheless a strong basis for the use of a section 317 analogy for 
proving employer negligence under Title VII. 
Application of this third category is further warranted because it 
would provide victims with the opportunity to prove negligence that is 
specific to their employers’ failure to prevent employees with day-to-day 
control from harassing others. For purposes of this category, 
“supervisor” would be defined as “an individual with the authority to 
direct the victim’s daily work activities,”214 excluding those whom the 
plaintiff has successfully proven to fall within the “apparent authority” 
category. Under this category, a duty to act would be reasonable because 
a special relationship akin to section 317 exists where the employer has 
made a day-to-day supervisor a proxy for itself. Where higher 
management cannot be physically present at every worksite or in every 
store location, the employer selects certain employees to manage the 
day-to-day operations of a particular workplace.215 Having empowered 
their employees with this authority, employers should be expected to 
fulfill their section 317 duty by creating a system through which 
harassment in the workplace can be better prevented or reported. 
Furthermore, this section 317 duty would require employers to train 
employees at all levels on matters including: their rights and obligations 
under existing workplace harassment laws; how to navigate the 
established reporting channels; and importantly, the company’s 
employment structure and chain of authority. Accordingly, the 
determination of an employer’s breach would be based on factors 
including the system of training and reporting it has in place, or should 
have, created. This connection between “day-to-day” supervisors and an 
employer’s duty under the circumstances of the system created is 
important because acts of harassment by lower-level supervisors could be 
better prevented or reported if employees (potential victims) were better 
informed. 
Several scenarios highlight the need for a category between mere 
coworkers and supervisors with actual or apparent authority to take 
“tangible employment actions.” One example is a scenario in which 
“[m]embers of a team may each have the responsibility for taking the 
lead with respect to a particular aspect of the work and thus, may have 
the responsibility to direct each other in that area of responsibility.”216 
Though this example falls outside of the scope of both category one (that 
is, the Vance Court’s narrow holding) and category two (apparent 
 
 214. Fair Employment Protection Act of 2014, H.R. 4227, 113th Cong. § 2(b)(2) (2d Sess. 2014). 
 215. See supra text accompanying note 94. Goss Graves et al., supra note 93, at 9. 
 216. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S Ct. 2434, 2452. 
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authority), the ability to direct another’s work still contains a level of 
control that a harasser may abuse. It is not difficult to imagine, for 
example, a scenario in which an employee might be left “unprotected 
against harassment by co-workers who possess the authority to inflict 
psychological injury by assigning unpleasant tasks or by altering the work 
environment in objectionable ways.”217 Though Justice Alito asserted 
that a victim in such a situation could “simply” show negligence, it is not 
so simple for a victim to succeed on a negligence claim, as discussed 
earlier in Part IV.B of this Note.218 
Even with the recognized difficulty in proving a negligence claim, 
the prominence of the negligence standard and the need for judicial 
efficiency suggest that this standard of proof does have a place in the 
scheme of liability for workplace harassment. In Vance, Justice Alito 
stated that, “[t]here is no reason why this [negligence] standard, if 
accompanied by proper instructions, cannot provide the same service in 
the context at issue here” as it provides to “tort plaintiffs in many other 
situations.”219 This category has the potential to fill this need for “proper 
instructions.” 
With breach so closely tied to employee training and transparency, 
this category would benefit employers, informing them of the avenues 
through which they might escape liability even under a negligence 
standard. Employers could act on this duty by clarifying the channels for 
reporting and providing information regarding employee hierarchy. As a 
result, employers could mitigate their own risks for breaching this duty 
while simultaneously supporting employees’ ability to navigate this 
system and obtain redress for harm suffered. 
D. Category Four: CoworkerNegligence 
The fourth category would encompass all coworkers who do not have 
any actual or apparent authority to take tangible employment actions or to 
control the victim’s day-to-day activities. Even pro-employee authorities 
like the EEOC have accepted and applied a negligence standard to 
instances of harassment or discrimination by coworkers.220 For this 
category, “a plaintiff [may] still prevail by showing that his or her employer 
was negligent in failing to prevent harassment [by a non-supervisor] from 
 
 217. Id. at 2451. 
 218. Id. at 2438. 
 219. Id. at 2452. 
 220. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 159, at I (“The Commission’s long-standing 
guidance on employer liability for harassment by co-workers remains in effectan employer is liable 
if it knew or should have known of the misconduct, unless it can show that it took immediate and 
appropriate corrective action.”); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (“With respect to conduct between 
fellow employees, an employer is responsible for acts of sexual harassment in the workplace where the 
employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) knows or should have known of the conduct, unless 
it can show that it took immediate and appropriate corrective action.”). 
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taking place.”221 A plaintiff would be able to prove negligence by pointing 
to her employer’s failure to “monitor the workplace, . . . respond to 
complaints, [or] . . . provide a system for registering complaints” or an 
employer’s “effective[] discourage[ment]” of complaint-filing.222 
In practice, this fourth category would apply where it would not be 
reasonable for the victim to believe that the harasser possessed any 
supervisory power or control. In this scenario, a coworker “can inflict 
‘psychological injuries’ by creating a hostile work environment, but [] 
‘cannot dock another’s pay, nor . . . demote another.’” Under such 
circumstances, vicarious liability is improper because it would be too 
difficult for employers to monitor the actions of all employees working as 
coworkers.223 For this reason, negligence is more appropriate because it 
imposes liability where “the employer knew or should have known about 
the conduct and failed to address it.”224 
Conclusion 
Recognizing that the aims of Title VII are not guaranteed to fare 
well following a congressional override, Congress must approach any 
opportunity for an override with careful consideration of the concerns 
expressed by the actors involvedemployers, employees, and courts. As 
it relates to the issue of employer liability, a tiered structure that reflects 
modern business as well as judicial and structural realities has the 
potential to reach a middle ground, acceptable to both pro-employer and 
pro-employee constituents. Resisting premature reactions and drafting 
more comprehensive legislative responses, Congress could pave the way 
for lasting progress and preserve the protective aims of Title VII by 
facilitating the simplicity sought by courts and acknowledging the 
complex realities of the modern-day workplace. 
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